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Summary
The rapid rise of new Asian powers intensifies the 
recognition of diverging interests and abilities 
among NATO members. To the US, the geopolitical 
significance of Europe is declining. Its future chal-
lenger is principally China. Russia, for many decades 
the main rival, could suddenly become a strategic 
asset worth wooing by the Americans. For Europe-
ans this is a confusing scenario.
Afghanistan has importance to the US beside its po-
tential as a safe haven for anti-Western terrorists. It 
borders Iran. And although influence in Central Asia 
might not rival the importance of the Indian Ocean 
and the Pacific, this is still one of the most important 
access routes for resources and markets throughout 
Eurasia. 
The US and NATO have not excluded a long-term 
presence in Afghanistan. If all goes according to 
plan, that ‘transition’ would still leave a military 
‘training mission’ beyond 2014. In effect that means 
bases. But withdrawing from a combat role requires 
the emergence of a new political reality in Afghani-
stan, and regional acceptance for an extended West-
ern presence. To achieve these will prove extremely 
difficult. 
Even if the US eventually acquiesces to complete 
military withdrawal from Afghanistan, the disparity 
in global reach and ambition will inevitably con-
tinue to tear the NATO alliance apart. Ahead of the 
November summit Europe seems determined to re-
claim it as a North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
Introduction
The struggling allies of NATO –that once-proud sym-
bol of Western unity – face stark choices at the Portu-
gal summit in November. Since the end of the Cold 
War, NATO has been bereft of its original rationale but 
its members have been able to maintain at least some 
semblance of common purpose. Enlargement into 
Central and East Europe, the military interventions in 
the Balkans, and the perceived threat from Muslim ter-
rorists have all served to bolster NATO. With the rapid 
rise of new challengers to US hegemony, however, the 
common interests and actions of NATO members can 
no longer be taken for granted. 
The Cold War ensured that Europe was an area of the 
most intense geopolitical significance. With the rise 
of emerging powers especially in the eastern part of 
Eurasia, the US area of interest and concern has begun 
shifting from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean and the 
Pacific, and from Europe to Central, South and East 
Asia. Russia, for many decades the main rival, could 
suddenly become a strategic asset worth wooing by 
the Americans. In geopolitical terms we might soon 
realize that ‘it is all about China, stupid’.
As for the Europeans, they seem to be slightly 
bemused spectators to the Pacific game rather than 
players. Europe is trying to consolidate and cope with 
the aftershocks of megaprojects like the huge eastward 
expansion of the EU and the introduction of the Euro. 
On the other hand, Europe is separated from East 
Asia by mountains, steppes, oceans and formidable 
states like Russia, Turkey and Iran. These geographic 
and political facts shape European interests and the 
role that European states are likely to play in the new 
geopolitical realities of the early 21st century.       
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NATO and the War in Afghanistan
The logic of occupying a land-locked, economically 
mar gi nal country in response to a terrorist attack from 
a group of radicals quite foreign to that very country 
(Afghanistan) is strategically and militarily ques tion-
able. Furthermore, Al-Qaida never constituted an exi-
sten tial threat to the US or its Western allies. 
Enemies can, of course, prove useful for internal 
pur poses. Moreover, Western leaders could project 
strength and vigour amidst the general stagnation and 
political disillusionment. Alliances were made and 
re-made; and smoke was created for geopolitical man-
oeuvres in pursuit of strategic advantages  like oil. But 
nine years after 9/11 it makes sense to remain sceptical 
of the wisdom of the Afghan enterprise to long-term 
Western interests. The benefits to Afghans and their 
neighbours are also in serious doubt.
The Bush administration did not show any interest in 
outright occupation and state-building in Afghanistan 
in the aftermath of 9/11. Donald Rumsfeld wanted a 
quick and limited engagement in the country. In doing 
so he bypassed NATO, and the Europeans feared that 
the Alliance might slide into irrelevance. Intra-West-
ern fractures over Iraq in 2003 deepened those fears. 
In response, Europe searched for a transatlantic politi-
cal–military project – which they thought found in 
Afghanistan. 
Thus the Europeans must take their share of responsi-
bil ity for the expansion of objectives and means towards 
countrywide military presence and state-building that 
started with the creation of ISAF in 2001 and gained 
momen tum since 2003. Afghan society – patriarchal 
and backward, culturally conservative, anti-secular 
and gender-illiterate – was a honey pot for enlightened 
pro gres sives and Alliance-conscious Europeans alike. 
More over, the early 2000s were sufficiently close to 
the optimistic and hegemonic post-Cold War era for 
the belief in Western righteousness, and confidence 
in its transformative capabilities, to reign supreme – 
at least on the elite level. Interventionism was still a 
respectable ideology in many Western minds. 
Whether nation-building in Afghanistan could have 
succeeded had the inputs been more consistent and 
wholehearted from the start is something we will never 
know. But reality has left the US and its increasingly 
disillusioned NATO companions with the mess of 
today. The stated objective now is for Afghans to take 
‘responsibility’ for their own security within a few years. 
To achieve this, the NATO alliance has been churning 
out Afghan armed police and military recruits at a 
staggering rate. A total of 300,000 security forces are 
set to be part of the Afghan National Security Forces 
(ANSF) by the end of 2011. Between 30 and 40% of the 
recruits disappear from the forces every year.
In order to defeat the Taliban in 2001, the US made 
allies with the mainly non-Pashtun Northern Alliance 
as well as with various Pashtun warlords and tribal 
leaders who were in opposition to, or could be lured 
away from, the Taliban. These allies became entrenched 
in the highly lucrative business of supporting and pro-
vid ing services to the foreign military and aid com-
munity. The drug business picked up as well. Cor rup-
tion became rife throughout the Karzai regime. 
In 2008/09, Western publics were offered some opti-
mism on the Afghan war from an ostensibly ‘new’ 
stra tegy of counterinsurgency (COIN). This was to 
be a population-centric military mission carried out 
through surging Western forces and a greater focus on 
pro tection of civilians and building local governance 
and economic development. In parallel, US Special 
For ces have targeted mid-level insurgent commanders 
for capture or kill operations. With the arrival of Gene-
ral David H. Petraeus, this rather enemy-centric part 
of the current population-centric strategy seems to be 
increasing, leaving much less talk of COIN. At the same 
time there are now tales of ‘negotiations’ with some 
Taliban elements. How much truth there is to this is 
un certain – according to US Special Representative 
Richard Holbrooke, ‘less than meets the eye’.
President Barack Obama has re-emphasized the regio-
nal dimension as key to solve Afghanistan’s problems, 
and has stepped up pressure on the Pakistani army 
to conduct operations against pro-Taliban militants 
along the Afghan border. But the US and NATO are 
justi fied in remaining sceptical as to the sincerity of 
the Pakistani military and intelligence establishment. 
Pro gress for NATO in Afghanistan could encourage a 
pro tracted US military presence there – to which both 
Paki stan and its strategic partner China would be, at 
best, ambivalent. Better then, perhaps, to keep the 
Taliban in business.
Obama has been criticized for sending mixed mes-
sages when he announced his Afghan strategy in De-
cem ber 2009. On the one hand he decided to send 
an additional 30.000 troops. But he also made it clear 
that withdrawal would begin in July 2011. According to 
the critics, that would leave too little time for the extra 
troops to make a decisive impact, and it would encour-
age the Taliban simply to wait the Americans out.
ISAF has sounded cautious optimism in the weeks 
leading up to the November NATO summit, but other 
voices remain sceptical to its claims of progress. The 
Taliban have been forced back from some areas in 
Helmand and Kandahar provinces, but they remain 
with a presence and constitute a threat both to ISAF 
and the local population. Moreover, insurgent activity 
has picked up in several provinces in northern Afghani-
stan. Many believe the Taliban is tactically avoid-
ing battles on ISAF’s terms, and that they have the 
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down begins to take effect. Local communities seem 
largely to be sitting on the fence, and the performance 
of the ANSF is less than persuasive. To counter this, 
vari ous local militias are being armed and encouraged 
to participate in local security initiatives and outright 
battles alongside ISAF and ANSF forces.
The US and its Afghanistan Policy
Upon taking office President Barack Obama claimed 
pub licly that the US objective in Afghanistan was to 
‘dis rupt, dismantle and defeat Al-Qaeda’. But, given 
the stakes actually involved, this singular obsession 
with Al-Qaida seems strategically confusing. From 
Obama’s Wars by Bob Woodward, it might appear 
that the US policy debate suffers either from deep dis-
honesty or pervasive delusions among the principals 
in volved. The public cover of counter-terrorism that 
the Bush administration used, in part, to legitimize 
a sustained and worldwide projection of American 
power now seems to have taken centre stage behind 
closed-door deliberations. 
Estimates put the total number of Al-Qaida in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan at less than 180. In order to 
hunt down these ragged would-be terrorists, the US 
and NATO are keeping 150,000 soldiers in Afghanistan 
at a cost of over $100 billion a year? If that is the whole 
story, then the West is indeed in serious drift.
The perceptions, and realities, of the global distri-
bu tion of power have changed over the last decade, 
spur red on by the increasing realization of China’s 
rise and Western decline. Even if Al-Qaida were the 
determining and overwhelming reason for the inva-
sion of 2001, the evolving global circumstances have 
forced new considerations into the fray, or will do so 
in the near future. 
Afghanistan has a border with Iran, the importance of 
which is obvious given that ‘all options’ are on the table. 
But even more, a US military presence in Afghanistan 
gives the Central Asian states a credible strategic alter-
native to Russia, China and Iran. The US has a his tory 
of abandoning its allies. Potential partners – among 
them also Russia – would feel more reassured as to 
the long-term value of this association if the US were 
also convincingly dependent upon them. And with 
bases in Afghanistan, the US would be so, for logis ti-
cal reasons. Heightening the stakes of this ‘new’ Great 
Game is, of course, the importance of Central Asia 
in both the production and transport of fossil fuels. 
Securing such geopolitical interests through the mili-
tary engagement in Afghanistan makes a strategic 
sense which Al-Qaida, with all due consideration to its 
dis ruptive effects on Western societies, must struggle 
to match.
There is also merit to the view that Afghanistan and 
Central Asia are somewhat marginal to the strategic 
competition between the US and China. The seaways 
through and from the Middle East are of far greater 
importance than the land routes further north. More-
over, the struggle for control and dominance will be 
fought more effectively in space and in cyberspace. 
But even if a longer-term projection of US land (and 
air) power into Central Asia is considered too ambi-
tious and not worth the cost (and perhaps also bla-
tantly provocative to rising powers and thereby 
poten tially backfiring), the strategic consequences of 
abandon ing this ‘front’ in the effort to contain China 
(and others) should at least be recognized by Western 
policy-makers. China is diversifying its access routes 
to resources and markets in all directions. The corridor 
through Central Asia is clearly considered important 
to the Chinese, and thus should be to its rivals. If the 
US military leaves Afghanistan, it will find it very hard 
to create a justification for returning in the future. 
What China readily accepted in its backyard in 2001 
might no longer apply.
It is hard to know what kind of reasoning is really 
going on in Washington. There are good reasons to 
stick publicly with the story of Al-Qaida. After all, it 
seems better to fight a defensive war for the protection 
of the homeland rather than an offensive war for re-
sour ces and strategic dominance. Here we should 
note that Defense Secretary Robert Gates recently 
re as sured America’s wary Afghan allies that ‘we are 
never leaving’. And to those on the ground, who see 
the huge bases being built, the US indeed seems to be 
pre paring for a lengthy stay.
The Path Ahead in Afghanistan
The US and NATO have still not burned the bridges 
to a long-term presence in Afghanistan. In fact, the 
hoped-for trajectory would leave a residual military 
force in a training and assistance capacity for the 
Afghan government well beyond 2014, when the 
projected ‘transition’ to Afghan security responsibility 
is set to be achieved. If all goes according to plan, 
that ‘transition’ would still leave open the possibility 
of continued US military bases in Afghanistan from 
which to project power into Central Asia. What is less 
clear is whether the US and NATO policy-makers are 
really aware of these ‘strategic’ and geopolitical aspects 
of their current trajectory. Publicly, they claim ignor-
ance, insisting that they will not stay ‘one day more 
than required’.  
In order to be able to withdraw from combat roles but 
still remain in a military capacity, the US and NATO 
must bank on the emergence of a different and more 
har monious political reality in Afghanistan. But those 
who expect any kind of lasting and formalized politi-
cal ‘deal’ between pro-government and pro-Taliban 
groups, especially on the premise that Western 
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forces are allowed to stay, should think twice. Politics 
in Afghanistan is much too fragmented and fluid, 
among those that have and have not (yet) taken up 
arms against ISAF. Groups will ebb and flow, and so 
will conflicts. No Afghan leader speaks for more than 
small part of the population, and shifting loyalties are 
common. Unless Iran, Pakistan, Russia and China 
can all agree to a long-term US military presence in 
Afghanistan, and thereby use their good offices to 
suppress, or at least not encourage, any significant 
local sabotage against this plan, the Western forces 
are bound to find themselves in hostile human terrain 
for the duration of their stay. But how likely is such a 
regional acceptance, given the global shifts in power? 
Conclusion
One of NATO’s main problems is the lack of clear 
think ing and honesty about the real stakes in Afghani-
stan. This lack of top-level candour and clarity as to the 
stakes and motivations undermines the very purpose 
of the objectives now being pursued in the Afghan 
war. 
The upcoming summit might be too soon for NATO 
to make up its mind as to how to approach the decline 
of West, and the rise of the rest of the world. The stra-
te gic concept should therefore be work in progress. 
But as it now looks, the message from Europe to the 
US seems clear: On the global stage you are on your 
own. European states are not harbouring any credible 
glo bal ambitions. 
Even if the US should eventually acquiesce to complete 
mili tary withdrawal from Afghanistan, the disparity in 
global reach and ambition is bound to keep tearing 
the Alliance apart, with the US shifting its focus more 
and more to the East. NATO then will, at best, remain 
what it always was – until the ISAF mission – a North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
